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Abstract
Using recently developed indicators of the strictness of employment protection legislation in
OECD countries, the paper examines the issue of whether strict employment protection
legislation may promote self-employment by encouraging employers to contract-out work to
self-employed workers. Contrary to the results of previous studies, the paper finds little
evidence for a positive relationship between self-employment and the strictness of EPL.
While the raw data suggest that a positive relationship may indeed exist, once suitable control
variables are introduced into the analysis, it appears that if anything, the opposite may be true:
i.e. stricter employment protection legislation may actually reduce self-employment.
JEL Codes: J21, J23
                                         
* The analysis reported in this paper grew out of work originally carried out for the OECD. I
am grateful to John Evans and Paula Adam of the OECD, for their help in providing some of
the data used in the analysis and to John Evans, Simon Parker and an anonymous referee for
their helpful comments on previous versions of the paper. Responsibility for the analysis and
interpretation of the data, and for the views expressed in the paper, is mine alone.
21. Introduction
In recent years, there has been a great deal of interest from academics and policy
makers in the effects of employment protection legislation (EPL) on labour market
performance. Empirical research into the effects of EPL has focussed chiefly on its role in
accounting for cross-national variations in the rate and structure of unemployment (see for
example, Bertola, 1990, Gregg and Manning, 1997, and Nickell, 1997).1 More recent work
has examined the effects of EPL on patterns of worker and job flows (Schettkat, 1997; and
Boeri, 1999). A final strand of research has attempted to analyse the impact of EPL on the
structure of employment. Within this vein, a recent study by the OECD (OECD, 1999) reports
evidence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between summary measures of
the strictness of employment protection legislation and the share of self-employment in
OECD member states.2 The explanation for this result, which echoes findings from previous
studies by OECD (1992) and Grubb and Wells (1993), is that employers may attempt to
circumvent the effects of regulations on their ability to hire and fire employees by
contracting-out work to self-employed contractors. This finding, if correct, suggests that
employers may be able to use self-employment as a means of undermining the intended
effects of employment protection legislation.  It would also lend support to the view that a
significant proportion of reported self-employment may be ‘false’, in the sense that the
workers concerned are essentially employees, but are employed on self-employment contracts
in order to economise on employers’ non-wage labour costs.3 The rate of self-employment has
                                         
1 For a recent theoretical analysis of the effects of employment protection regulations see
Pissarides (2001).
2 The study by the OECD contains a detailed summary of previous work on the effects of EPL
on labour market performance.
3 Pfieffer (1999) documents the prevalence of this phenomenon in Germany. A number of
OECD countries have recently introduced measures designed to control the incidence of such
‘false’ self-employment. See OECD (2000) for a detailed summary.
3recently been increasing in a number of OECD countries (OECD, 2000). At the same time,
there has been a resurgence of interest within government policy-making circles in issues
relating to entrepreneurship.4 In the light of this, it is important to ask whether the increases in
self-employment that have been observed may simply reflect the response of employers to an
increasing burden of labour market regulation – and hence are merely indicative of an
increase in the incidence of ‘false’ self-employment - or whether they reflect a genuine
resurgence of entrepreneurial activity in the countries concerned. The present paper attempts
to shed some light on this issue by re-examining the evidence on the relationship between the
incidence of self-employment in OECD countries and the strictness of EPL.
The analysis reported in the paper is conducted in two strands. In the first, we examine
the relationship between EPL and the rate of non-agricultural self-employment in the OECD
using panel data on an index of the overall strictness of employment protection legislation
recently compiled by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000). The data used in this analysis covers 13
OECD countries for seven five-year periods from the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s. In the
second strand, we use data compiled by the OECD that provides a breakdown of the incidence
of EPL into measures of its constituent components - namely, regulations relating to the
protection of regular employment; to the protection of temporary employment; and
regulations governing collective dismissals. This analysis follows the findings of OECD
(1999), which indicate that the incidence of self-employment is positively related to the
strictness of regulations relating to the protection of regular employment, rather than to
regulations relating to temporary employment or collective dismissals. The figures compiled
by the OECD cover a slightly broader range of countries than is used in the first part of the
analysis, but only two time periods: the late 1980s and the mid-1990s.
                                                                                                                          
4 See, for example, OECD (1998) and Commission of the European Communities (1999).
4In brief, the results from the two strands of the analysis suggest that the findings of
previous studies concerning the relationship between the strictness of employment protection
legislation and the rate of self-employment are non-robust. While the raw data do indeed
suggest the existence of a positive relationship between EPL and the rate of self-employment,
this evidence disappears once controls are introduced for other potential influences on the rate
of self-employment; in particular, once allowance is made for the presence of country-specific
fixed effects. On the basis of the present analysis, we therefore conclude that there is only
very limited evidence to support the hypothesis that stricter employment protection legislation
promotes self-employment.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the summary measure of the
strictness of EPL that is compiled by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and examines the
relationship between this measure and the rate of non-agricultural self-employment in 13
OECD countries. Section 3 performs a similar analysis using the figures compiled by OECD
(1999) on the constituent components of EPL. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. Measures of the Strictness of Employment Protection Legislation
A number of studies have been carried out that have attempted to construct
comparative measures of the strictness of employment protection legislation across different
countries (Emerson, 1988; Bertola, 1990; Lazear, 1990; Grubb and Wells 1993, OECD 1999).
The study by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) builds on the work carried out by OECD (1999)
and Lazear (1990) to construct a summary indicator of the strictness of employment
protection legislation that covers a number of OECD countries over the period from 1960
through to the mid-1990s. The indicator is scaled to lie between a minimum value of 0
                                                                                                                          
5(corresponding to very weak employment protection) and a maximum of 6 (corresponding to
very strict protection).5
Table I shows values of the indicator of the strictness of employment protection for
three selected periods for the 13 OECD countries for which we have corresponding time-
series data on the rate of non-agricultural self-employment.  In summary, the data indicate
that the overall strictness of EPL tends to be highest in Spain and Italy, and weakest in the
USA, Canada and the United Kingdom, with Australia and Ireland not far behind. In a
number of countries, but most notably in Sweden, there is evidence of a relaxation of the
strictness of EPL during the 1990s. The main exception to this trend is France, for which there
is an increase in the indicator of the overall strictness of EPL between the late 1980s and the
mid-1990s, due to the imposition of tighter restrictions on the maximum cumulative duration
of fixed term contracts and tighter limits on the scope of the activities of Temporary Work
Agencies (TWAs).6
  Table II shows corresponding data from OECD (1999) that provides information on
the constituent components of employment protection legislation. The Table shows indicators
of measures relating to the protection of regular workers from the threat of dismissal, the
regulation of collective dismissals, and the regulation of temporary employment contracts.
The indicators are scaled to lie between 0 and 6 in the same way as the Blanchard and
                                         
5 See the Appendix to Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) for details of the construction of the
indicator of the strictness of EPL. The Appendix is available at
http://web.mit.edu/blanchar/www/articles.html
6 See OECD (1999)
6Wolfers indicator of the overall strictness of EPL (which itself is based on the OECD
measure).7
The picture that emerges from these figures is similar to that in Table I, though it
covers a slightly broader range of countries, but only two time periods: the late 1980s and the
mid-1990s. The figures show that Belgium and Germany joined Sweden in implementing a
noticeably more lenient employment protection regime during the 1990s. In each case, this
manifested itself principally in the form of a relaxation of regulations relating to the hiring of
temporary workers, including regulations governing the use of fixed term contracts and the
activities of TWAs. A detailed analysis of the figures, including comparisons with indicators
of the strictness of EPL compiled by other studies, is presented in OECD (1999).
                                         
7 Note that information on the strictness of regulations governing collective dismissals is only
available for the mid-1990s. To maintain consistency with the figures for the late 1980s,
therefore, the figures for the overall indicator of the strictness of EPL exclude information on
the severity of regulations relating to collective dismissals.
73. Analysis of the Relationship Between Self-employment and the Strictness of
EPL
The present study is motivated by the results of previous analyses by OECD (1992),
Grubb and Wells (1993) and in particular, OECD (1999), which report evidence of a positive
relationship between the strictness of employment protection legislation and the incidence of
self-employment in OECD countries.  The explanation put forward for this finding is that
employers may use self-employed contractors as a means of circumventing the restrictions
that EPL imposes on their ability to hire and fire employees. If correct, this finding implies
that employers may be able to significantly undermine the intended effects of job security
legislation by substituting self-employed contractors for waged workers, or by placing
members of the workforce on self-employment contracts. The latter, in turn, may imply that a
significant proportion of observed self-employment may be ‘false’, in the sense that the
mantle of self-employment is used to cloak what is essentially an employment contract. The
implications for the conduct of employment policy and, in particular, for the efficacy of
policies designed to promote or facilitate self-employment, suggest that this is a topic worthy
of further investigation.
 The analysis of the present paper is conducted in two strands. In the first, we use panel
data on thirteen OECD countries for the period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s.8
Blanchard and Wolfers calculate their index of the strictness of EPL for a sequence of five-
year intervals.9 In Figure I, we plot the values of this index against the corresponding five-
                                         
8 The countries are those listed in Table I. Note that we have three missing observations - data
on the rate of non-agricultural self-employment in Finland is only available from 1970-4,
while for the Netherlands it is only available from 1975-9. Hence, the maximum number of
observations for this analysis is 88.
9 The final observation covers just three years, 1995-7.
8year average values of the rate of non-agricultural self-employment in our thirteen countries.10
The picture is consistent with the notion of a positive relationship between the strictness of
EPL and the incidence of self-employment, and this is supported by the results of a simple
OLS regression, reported in the first column of Table III. However, the evidence of a positive
relationship between EPL and the rate of self-employment quickly disappears when we allow
for the presence of country-specific fixed effects, as shown in the second column of the Table.
Similar results emerge f om a random effects specification, and from models with the log of
the self-employment rate as the dependent variable.11
Does the introduction of other potential explanatory variables for the rate of self-
employment alter the findings? To investigate this, we introduce into the analysis a set of
explanatory variables that have been found in other studies to have a significant effect on
cross-national variations in the rate of self-employment. These are: the level of GDP per
capita; the rate of female labour force participation; the average rate of income tax; payroll
taxes; and the unemployment benefit replacement ratio. The first of these variables has been
found by Acs, Audretsch and Evans (1994) to have a significant negative effect on the rate of
non-agricultural self-employment in the OECD. The explanation for this, following the
analysis of Lucas (1978), is that a rise in the level of GDP per capita is associated with a
decline in the returns to self-employment relative to those from waged employment. Acs et al.
also find that the rate of self-employment is positively related to the rate of unemployment
                                         
10 We exclude the agricultural sector, as self-employment in this sector is likely to be heavily
influenced by historically and culturally determined traditions of family-based ownership.
11 Hausman test results indicate that the fixed effects specification is superior to the random
effects one. These results are available from the author, on request.
9and the rate of female labour force participation, though the former appears significant only in
a bivariate context.12
A number of studies find evidence of a link between income tax rates and the rate of
self-employment (e.g. Blau, 1987; Robson, 1998; Parker and Robson, 2000; Bruce, 2000;
Schuetze, 2000). Robson and Wren (1999) show that it is important to distinguish between the
effects of changes in the marginal rate of income tax and changes in the average rate of tax.
Using data for 15 OECD countries, they find that the former have a negative effect on the rate
of self-employment while the latter have a positive effect. Unfortunately, for this study we do
not have data for the marginal rate of income tax and so only the average rate of income tax is
included.
We measure the rate of payroll tax using the average rate of employers’ social security
contributions. This is included as a control variable in the regressions on the grounds that in
the absence of perfect tax shifting, a high rate of employers’ social security contributions may
motivate employers to use self-employed contractors as a means of reducing the cost of
labour. In support of this hypothesis, OECD (1992) reports a correlation of 0.7 between the
rate of employers’ social security contributions and the rate of self-employment in a cross-
section of OECD countries.
Finally, the benefit replacement ratio is included on the grounds that a high ratio of
benefits to earnings may discourage the unemployed from setting up in business. Moreover,
as self-employed workers often do not enjoy the same entitlement to benefits as those in
waged employment, a high replacement ratio may also deter some workers from leaving paid-
                                         
12 A positive relationship between self-employment and the rate of unemployment is also
reported in the cross-country study carried out by Staber and Bogenhold (1993). However,
Blanchflower (2000) reports a negative relationship between self-employment and
unemployment for most of the countries in his data sample.
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employment for self-employment for fear of losing their access to benefits. Both Staber and
Bogenhold (1993) and Parker and Robson (2000) report evidence of a negative relationship
between the replacement ratio and the rate of self-employment in the OECD.
In keeping with the previous analysis, the additional explanatory variables are entered
in the form of five-year averages. The results are reported in the third column of Table III.
They show significant positive effects on the rate of non-agricultural self-employment from
the rate of unemployment and the payroll tax rate and a significant negative effect from the
average rate of income tax. None of the other additional explanatory variables is statistically
significant. Most importantly for the current analysis, the results show that the addition of
these extra variables fails to restore the initial finding of a positive relationship between the
strictness of EPL and the rate of non-agricultural self-employment.13 Instead, they suggest
that an increase in the strictness of employment protection legislation may, if anything, lead to
a reduction in the rate of self-employment, other things equal. An explanation for this may be
that workers are deterred from entering self-employment through fear that strict regulations
on hiring and firing may prevent them from making a speedy return to waged-employment in
the event of business failure. Alternatively, it may be that tighter job security regulations
discourage entry into self-employment by those who themselves expect to become employers.
Finally, it may be that the co-existence of a high level of employment protection legislation
and a low rate of self-employment in certain countries is symptomatic of a general aversion to
employment instability amongst members of the country’s workforce. Individuals who are
risk averse may be unwilling to enter self-employment and more inclined to support the
introduction of government measures to restrict the flexibility of employment contracts.
                                                                                                                          
13 Missing observations on some of the additional explanatory variables mean that the sample
size in this regression is reduced to 68. In particular, we have no observations for Ireland or
Norway, as the payroll tax data is unavailable for these countries.
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The Relationship Between Self-employment and the Individual Components of EPL
In this second strand of the analysis, we use the data from OECD (1999) - as reported
in Table II – on the constituent components of EPL. Specifically, we examine the effects on
self-employment of regulations relating to regular employment contracts and regulations
governing the use of temporary employment. Compared with the previous analysis using the
Blanchard and Wolfers summary measure of the overall strictness of EPL, we have data on a
slightly larger range of countries – including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece,
and Portugal, but excluding Japan – but only two time periods: the late 1980s and the mid-
1990s.
As a first step, we again perform a simple fixed effects regression of the relationship
between the overall indicator of the strictness of EPL and the rate of non-agricultural self-
employment using the new data set.14 The results are reported in the first column of Table IV
and indicate strongly the presence of a negative, rather than a positive, relationship between
the strictness of EPL and the rate of self-employment. The results reported in the second
column of Table IV indicate that, in particular, it is the presence of strict regulations on the
use of temporary employment contracts that is associated with a reduction in the rate of self-
employment.
In the third and fourth columns of the Table, we investigate the effects of introducing
additional explanatory variables into the analysis. The third column introduces the full set of
explanatory variables used in the earlier analysis of the Blanchard and Wolfers measure of
EPL. The results are quite poor in the sense that none of the additional explanatory variables
                                                                                                                          
14 A qualitatively similar result is obtained with a random effects specification. However, the
result of a Hausman test indicates that the random effects specification is decisively rejected
in favour of fixed effects.
12
attains statistical significance. Further analysis indicates that this may be due to the presence
of multicollinearity amongst the explanatory variables.15 As a result of this, in the final
column, we report the results of a fixed effects regression in which the log of real GDP per
capita is included as the sole additional explanatory variable.   The picture remains the same:
we find no evidence of a positive relationship between the strictness of EPL in a country and
the rate of self-employment. If anything, the opposite seems to be true: i.e. stricter
employment protection legislation reduces the incidence of self-employment.
Comparison with the Results of Previous Studies
 How can we reconcile these results with those of previous studies, which as we have
seen, have found evidence of a positive relationship between the strictness of EPL and the
incidence of self-employment in OECD countries? In particular, how can we reconcile the
results with those from OECD (1999), which used a data sample very similar to that used in
the second part of our analysis? The answer seems to lie with the definition of the dependent
variable that is used. The analysis reported in OECD (1999) is based on a definition of the
dependent variable that includes the agricultural sector. The specific variable used is the share
of self-employment in total employment. Table V shows the results when we repeat the
second part of our analysis above, using this definition of the dependent variable instead of
the rate of non-agricultural self-employment. The evidence for a positive relationship between
the strictness of EPL and self-employment is restored, though it is specifically the strictness
of regulations governing regular employment contracts that seems to matter.
                                                                                                                          
15 Regressing the explanatory variables on one another, leads to R2 va ues m stly in the range
0.5 – 0.7. The highest value, 0.72, is obtained when EPL is regressed on the additional
explanatory variables. The coefficients in this regression equation suggest that the strictness
of employment protection legislation is most closely related to the rate of payroll tax and the
log of per capita GDP.
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We suggested earlier that there are likely to be particular factors that influence the
incidence of self-employment in the agricultural sector. In particular, there seems little reason
to suppose that the high rates of self-employment that are traditionally observed in this sector
can be substantially explained by the effects of employment protection legislation. We would
therefore suggest that it is the regression results reported in Tables III and IV that are most
likely to reflect the true relationship between the strictness of EPL and the rate of self-
employment in OECD economies. At the very least, the results of this study suggest that the
evidence for a positive relationship between the strictness of EPL and the incidence of self-
employment rests on rather flimsy empirical foundations.16
                                         
16 One possible explanation for our inability to find robust evidence of a positive relationship
between the strictness of EPL and the incidence of self-employment may be the existence of
measurement error in the dependent variable. The OECD data on self-employment that are
used in this study are drawn from the results of national labour force surveys. In these surveys
the classification of a worker as self-employed or an employee is based on the respondent’s
own perception of their employment status. As is noted in the text, firms may respond to an
increase in the strictness of EPL by moving some of their workers from employment contracts
to self-employed contractor status. However, the worker – particularly if he or she continues
to provide labour services solely to their previous employer – may be unaware of the change
in their status. Note, however, that the existence of this kind of ‘false’ self-employment
cannot explain the discrepancy between the results of this study and those of previous
analyses as these too use OECD data in the construction of the dependent variable.
14
4. Conclusions
Analysis reported in OECD (1999) and other studies finds evidence of a positive
relationship between the strictness of employment protection legislation and the incidence of
self-employment in OECD member states. In particular, in OECD (1999) it is found that
increases in the strictness of regulations relating to regular employment contracts appear to
lead to an increase in the share of self-employment in total employment. These findings
suggest that employers may use self-employed labour as a means of circumventing the
restrictions imposed on their ability to hire and fire employees.
In this study, we have undertaken a further investigation of the relationship between
the strictness of employment protection legislation and the incidence of self-employment in
the OECD. Using a panel data set for 13 OECD countries covering the period from the mid-
1960s to the mid-1990s, we have found that the evidence for a positive relationship between
EPL and self-employment disappears when allowance is made for the presence of country-
specific fixed effects.17 Subsequently, we have shown that the findings concerning the
relationship between the individual components of EPL and the incidence of self-employment
are sensitive to whether or not the agricultural sector is included in the definition of the
dependent variable.
On the basis of this analysis, we conclude that the findings of a positive relationship
between EPL and self-employment reported in previous studies are non-robust. Contrary to
the suggestion of these studies, there appears to be only very limited evidence to support the
notion that stricter employment protection legislation promotes self-employment. As in
                                         
17 These fixed effects may capture differences between countries in the measurement of self-
employment, in particular the treatment of owner-managers of incorporated businesses (see
the Appendix to OECD, 1992, for a detailed discussion of measurement issues).
Alternatively, they may reflect differences between countries in the latent capacity for
entrepreneurship (Blanchflower, Oswald and Stutzer, 2001).
15
previous studies of this issue, the relatively small sample sizes of the available data temper the
conclusions that may be drawn from the analysis and should be borne in mind when
interpreting the results. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely on the basis of the findings we have
reported that attempts by employers to circumvent the restrictions that EPL imposes on their
ability to hire and fire labour can account for the increases in self-employment that have
recently been experienced in a number of OECD countries.
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Table I. The Blanchard and Wolfers Index of the Strictness of Employment Protection
Legislation (Selected Values)
Country 1965-9 1985-9 1995-7
Australia 1 1 1
Canada 0.6 0.6 0.6
Finland 2.4 2.4 2.1
France 1.02 2.6 3.1
Ireland 0.25 1 1.1
Italy 4 4 3.4
Japan 2.8 2.8 2.8
Netherlands 2.7 2.7 2.4
Norway 3.1 3.1 2.7
Spain 4 3.8 3.1
Sweden 0 3.6 2.4
United Kingdom0.33 0.7 0.7
USA 0.2 0.2 0.2
Source: Appendix to Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), available at http://web.mit.edu/blanchar/www/articles.html
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Table II. OECD Summary Indicators of the Strictness of Employment Protection
Legislation
Overall EPL Strictness Regular Employment Temporary EmploymentCollectiveDismissalsa
Late 1980s Mid 1990sb Late 1980s Mid 1990sb Late 1980s Mid 1990sb Mid 1990sb
Australia 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 2.6
Austria 2.2 2.2 2.6 2.6 1.8 1.8 3.3
Belgium 3.1 2.1 1.5 1.5 4.6 2.8 4.1
Canada 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.3 0.3 3.4
Denmark 2.1 1.2 1.6 1.6 2.6 0.9 3.1
Finland 2.3 2.0 2.7 2.1 1.9 1.9 2.4
France 2.7 3.0 2.3 2.3 3.1 3.6 2.1
Germany 3.2 2.5 2.7 2.8 3.8 2.3 3.1
Greece 3.6 3.6 2.5 2.4 4.8 4.8 3.3
Ireland 0.9 0.9 1.6 1.6 0.3 0.3 2.1
Italy 4.1 3.3 2.8 2.8 5.4 3.8 4.1
Netherlands 2.7 2.1 3.1 3.1 2.4 1.2 2.8
Norway 3.0 2.6 2.4 2.4 3.5 2.8 2.8
Portugal 4.1 3.7 4.8 4.3 3.4 3.0 3.6
Spain 3.7 3.8 3.9 2.6 3.5 3.5 3.1
Sweden 3.5 2.2 2.8 2.8 4.1 1.6 4.5
UK 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.3 2.9
USA 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 2.9
 Source: OECD (1999), Table 2.5.
Notes:
a  Information on the strictness of regulations governing collective dismissals is only available for the mid 1990s.
For consistency, this information is therefore omitted from the calculations for the figures for the overall
strictness of EPL for this period. An alternative summary indicator of the strictness of EPL in the late 1990s, that
includes information on the strictness of regulations relating to collective dismissals, is reported in OECD
(1999).
b OECD (1999) refers to this period as the ‘Late 1990s’, but as the data relate to the years 1995-7, the term ‘Mid
1990s’ seems more appropriate.
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Table III. The Relationship Between Self-employment and the Strictness of Employment
Protection Legislation (Blanchard and Wolfers Index)
The dependent variable is the rate of non-agricultural self-employment
OLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
Blanchard & Wolfers EPL Index 1.622 - 0.471 - 0.744
(5.28) (1.21) (1.61)
ln [GDP per capita] - 1.729
(1.08)
Unemployment rate 0.214
(2.27)
Female participation rate 0.027
(0.89)
Income tax rate - 0.228
(3.30)
Payroll tax rate 0.195
(2.46)
Benefit replacement ratio 0.023
(0.43)
R2 0.24 0.88 0.95
F-test of significance of fixed effects 32.9 [p = 0.00] 8.5  [p = 0.00]
No. of observations. 88 88 68
Notes:
1. t-ratios in parentheses.
2. Intercept terms included but not reported.
See text and Data Appendix for variable definitions and data sources.
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Table IV. The Relationship Between Self-employment and the OECD Indicators of the
Strictness of Employment Protection Legislation
The dependent variable is the rate of non-agricultural self-employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall EPL - 1.125
(3.07)
Regular Employment EPL - 0.694 - 0.736 - 0.322
(1.05) (0.73) (0.46)
Temporary Employment EPL - 0.496 - 0.398 - 0.368
(2.18) (1.16) (1.52)
ln [GDP per capita] - 0.242 2.430
(0.04) (1.34)
Unemployment rate - 0.036
(0.32)
Female participation rate 0.053
(0.39)
Income tax rate - 0.124
(0.92)
Payroll tax rate 0.024
(0.27)
Benefit replacement ratio - 0.022
(0.61)
R2 0.36 0.29 0.48 0.37
F-test of significance of fixed effects106.7 [p = 0.00]81.0 [p = 0.00] 19.7 [p = 0.00] 29.3 [p = 0.00]
Fixed effects estimation; t-ratios in parentheses.
Number of observations = 36
Intercept terms not reported.
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Table V. Regressions on OECD Indicators of the Strictness of EPL with the Share of
Self-employment in Total Employment as the Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall EPL 0.961
(1.14)
Regular Employment EPL 3.966 2.547 2.798
(3.64) (1.79) (2.96)
Temporary Employment EPL 0.021 - 0.569 - 0.380
(0.06) (1.19) (1.16)
ln [GDP per capita] - 8.360 - 7.644
(1.09) (3.11)
Unemployment rate - 0.027
(0.17)
Female participation rate 0.014
(0.07)
Income tax rate - 0.005
(0.02)
Payroll tax rate - 0.003
(0.03)
Benefit replacement ratio - 0.042
(0.83)
R2 0.07 0.47 0.72 0.69
F-test of significance of fixed effects82.3 [p = 0.00]126.1 [p = 0.00]38.7 [p = 0.00] 68.2 [p = 0.00]
Fixed effects estimation; t-ratios in parentheses.
Number of observations = 36
Intercept terms not reported.
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Figure I. The Relationship Between the Rate of Non-agricultural Self-employment and
the Blanchard and Wolfers Index of EPL
Sources: see text and Data Appendix
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Data Appendix
First Data Set
As indicated in the text, in the part of the analysis we use average data on 13 countries for
seven time periods: 1965-69, 1970-4, 1975-9, 1980-4, 1985-9, 1990-4, and 1995-7. The
countries included in the sample are: Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and USA.
Blanchard and Wolfers EPL Index
See the Appendix to Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) for details of the construction of the
index. The Appendix and data are available from Olivier Blanchard’s home page,
http://web.mit.edu/blanchar/www/articles.html
Rate of Non-agricultural Self-employment
Non-agricultural self-employment as a percentage of total civilian non-agricultural
employment (employees plus self-employed) plus unemployment. Source OECD Labour
Force Statistics.
Real GDP per Capita
GDP per capita in US dollars at 1990 prices and exchange rates. Source: OECD National
Accounts.
Unemployment Rate
Unemployed as a percentage of the labour force. Source: OECD Labour Force Statistics.
Female Labour Force Participation Rate
Total female labour force as a percentage of the female population aged 15-64. Source:
OECD Labour Force Statistics.
Average Rate of Income Tax
Income tax payments plus employees’ social security contributions as a percentage of wages
and salaries plus the operating surplus of unincorporated enterprises plus property income.
Sources: tables of the income and outlay accounts of households and unincorporated
enterprises in OECD National Accounts Statistics and UN National Accounts Statistics.
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Payroll Tax Rate
Employers’ contributions to social security as a percentage of wages and salaries. Sources:
income and outlay accounts of households and unincorporated enterprises in OECD National
Accounts Statistics and UN National Accounts Statistics.
Replacement Ratio
Overall average of gross replacement ratios for three types of families (single person, married
person with dependent spouse, married person with spouse in work) and two earnings levels
(average earnings and 66.7 per cent average earnings. Source: OECD Database of Benefit
Entitlements and Gross Replacement Rates. Data kindly supplied by John Evans of the
OECD.
Second Data Set
Except where stated, the data are six-year averages for the years 1985-90 and 1992-7. The 18
countries included in the sample are: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland,
Netherlands, United Kingdom, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Denmark, Finland, Norway,
Sweden, Canada, USA, and Australia. For the most part, the variable definitions and data
sources are the same as those for the first data set. The exceptions are listed below.
OECD Summary Indicators of the Strictness of EPL
Source: OECD (1999), which contains a detailed discussion of the construction of the
indicators and the data sources from which they are compiled.
Average Rate of Income Tax
Average rate of income tax (%) for single person with no children, earning the average
production worker’s wage. The data are averages of observations for 1985, 1987, 1989, and
1994-6, respectively. Calculated from data provided by John Evans of the OECD.
Payroll Tax Rate
Ratio of employers’ social security contributions to earnings of average production worker
(%). The data are averages of observations for 1985, 1987, 1989, and 1994-6, respectively.
Calculated from data provided by John Evans of the OECD.
Share of Self-employment in Total Employment
Calculated from data kindly supplied by Paula Adams of the OECD.
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